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Abstract—The platform for research on auction mechanisms
is a distributed simulation framework providing means to
carry out research on resource allocation eﬃciency mecha-
nisms and user strategies. Both kinds of algorithms exam-
ined are completely user-deﬁned. Interaction of algorithms is
recorded and pre-deﬁned measures for the ﬁnal resource al-
location are calculated. Underlying database design provides
for eﬃcient results lookup and comparison across diﬀerent ex-
periments, thus enabling research groupwork. A recognised,
open and ﬂexible information model is employed for experi-
ment descriptions.
Keywords—auctions, market simulation, multi-commodity mar-
kets.
1. Introduction
The rules for interchange of goods are the legal setting
determining market operation. Design of such rules is a
fascinating, demanding and important task, often precon-
ditioning eﬃcient operation of economies. When present
on a market driven by a set of rules, an entity always im-
plements its own best strategy, developed subject to those
rules. However, the entity’s initial decision to participate
depends on the market attractiveness, comprising its legal
framework.
Developing rules for market operation such that desired
aims are reached, or trading mechanism design, was one of
subjects in collaborative research project “Next-Generation
Services and Data Networks — technology, application and
market aspects”, supported by Polish Ministry of Science
and Higher Education. The structure of activities for the-
matic group “Trading models for transmission services mar-
ketplace” is presented in Fig. 1. Note that market clearing,
bidding and resource allocation strategies have been con-
sidered there as parallel tasks. Examining how they interact
when put together is rarely available with analytical mod-
els, especially that they are developed by many research
teams, and thus with various approach.
This is where the developed platform for research on auc-
tion mechanisms (PRAM) comes in, providing those re-
search groups the common language and information model
to express the settings of the market, the common entity-
market interaction scheme, and the common repository of
searchable results. PRAM is, chronologically, the ﬁnalisa-
tion of the project research activities, making it possible
Fig. 1. The position of PRAM creation task within “Trading
models for transmission services marketplace” thematic group.
to carry out simulation-driven analysis of strategies devel-
oped. It provides for veriﬁcation of strategies while their
assumptions are partially not met or the information about
market state is incomplete.
The structure of this document is as follows. Section 2
presents existent and mature trading platforms, while
PRAM architecture and functionality is explained in Sec-
tion 3. This is followed by discussion on comparison cri-
teria for bandwidth trading mechanisms in Section 4. Con-
clusions are given in Section 5.
2. Existent Frameworks for Interchange
of Goods
Information, functional and physical architectures of exem-
plary trading platforms are presented below. This overview
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is an improved version of the material presented in [1]. Ex-
amples supporting multilateral trade, e.g. where many par-
ticipants place sell and/or buy oﬀers at the same time, have
been selected. The examples come from various branches
and support interchange of diﬀerent kinds of goods. Great
majority of presented examples are fully operational in the
business, but some concepts still in research phase are pre-
sented as well.
2.1. FCC’s Integrated Spectrum Auction System
The automated auction system (AAS) was the ﬁrst Fed-
eral Communications Commission’s system used to sup-
port frequencies auctioning. AAS required from bidders
to use a dedicated software and to use dialup connections
to FCC’s call centre. Because of growing Internet popu-
larity, AAS was decided to be upgraded to an online web
application.
The current new integrated spectrum auction system (ISAS)
has replaced the former AAS and Form 175 systems (the
latter serving ﬁlling up frequency request forms). When
compared to its predecessors, ISAS oﬀers extended func-
tionalities including request data validation, advanced data
query, integration with other FCC forms, ergonomc inter-
face, improved bid placement [2]. The system is now open
to every Internet user.
ISAS system provides for simultaneous auctions with many
rounds and the possibility to bid for a bunch of licenses.
2.2. WARSET – Warsaw Stock Exchange Trading System
The quoting at Warsaw stock exchange (WSE) is done via
WARSET transaction system [3]. WARSET supports fully
automated oﬀers processing and transaction making. It is
easily accessible and provides complex information about
the market. Moreover, WARSET is now integrated with
brokerage, thus facilitating bidding for broker’s customers.
The principal WARSET contractor, acting within a consor-
tium, has provided the necessary hardware and the client
application, making it possible for 37 brokerages collocated
with WSE to connect instantly, and for the rest to connect
via wide area network. Auxiliary transfer agents have been
developed, like the one to interact with the Polish National
Depository for Securities.
2.3. Polish Power Exchange
Polish power exchange (PPE) has been founded as a central
component of the Polish energy market undergoing liber-
alization. Since its very beginning, PPE was in the fore
while deploying novel solutions for energy trading. Within
six months of PPE’s operation the spot energy market has
started, with its prices being the reference point in bilateral
contracts. In 2003 PPE has been licensed by Polish ﬁnan-
cial supervision authority to operate an electricity market-
place.
In 2008 PPE has started commodity derivatives market.
Derivatives for energy quoted there make it possible to
calculate longer-term electricity prices, which enables big
market players to forecast and optimize buy or sell prices.
PPE runs on a state-of-the-art trading platform, provided
by NASDAQ OMX – the biggest manufacturer of trading
platforms in the world [4]. PPE is technically capable to
serve whole Polish energy market.
2.4. MERKATO – Bandwidth Marketplace
New York-based bandwidth trading platform MERKATO
did not count much on the market, but it was a remarkable
enterprise. MERKATO was designed as an open and scal-
able platform for real-time bandwidth acquisition in Inter-
net. The auction algorithm serving requests, invented and
patented by The Invisible Hand Inc., was based on a pro-
gressive second-price auction. MERKATO had adopted
a distributed approach: a microauction was organized for
each network resource, as bandwidth. Therefore, bids for
resource bundles had to be submitted and processed inde-
pendently [5].
Market clearing was done every 5 minutes, by collecting
bids, calculating equilibrium prices and allocating through-
put to winners. Interestingly, the whole process was fully
automated: once the winners got selected, the operators
reconﬁgured their networks and access points accordingly.
Moreover, MERKATO oﬀered derivatives market where fu-
tures were traded in broad time-scale.
Unfortunately, MERKATO is not operational since 2007,
and without an apparent successor or a competitor.
2.5. PeerMart – a Distributed P2P Auction System
PeerMart is a technology for auction-based resource inter-
change in peer-to-peer (P2P) networks [6]. P2P networks
growth is driven by an idea of sharing own and using oth-
ers’ resources worldwide, by means of agents running on
home PCs, without centralized management of any sort.
However, P2P users often act egoistically, e.g. by not pro-
viding any resources and switching their PCs on only when
they need to use others’ resources.
PeerMart was designed to solve such problems by intro-
ducing incentives to share own resources. It utilizes dou-
ble auctions in distributed setting, thus rewarding valuable
content. Furthermore, redundancy mechanisms are applied
to ensure system robustness in presence of non-cooperating
agents.
Every resource is sold or bought in PeerMart via a double
auction carried out by dispersed broker-peers (auctioneers).
2.6. Storage Exchange
Storage Exchange is another double-auction based trading
platform [7]. The goods being traded is storage space: the
sellers are storage providers or any businesses possessing
free disk space, and the buyers are institutions in need of
virtual disks.
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2.7. Band-X – Architecture for Bandwidth Trade in IP
Networks
The band-X system is not the operational bandwidth trad-
ing platform; it rather a mature concept of such system,
developed at Drexel University [8]. Quality of service pro-
vided through DiﬀServ and IntServ technologies are the
system technical foundations. Multilateral agreements are
supported, as well as spot and derivative trading. The work
focused on organizational aspects of the platform operation.
3. The Platform Architecture
and Functionality
The platform for research on auction mechanisms is a tool
supporting examination of behavior of models developed
in the course of the project. There are two kinds of mod-
els: representing auctioning and resource allocation pro-
cess, and representing market entities activities. The basic
scope of PRAM application includes
– veriﬁcation of theoretical model properties through
simulation,
– estimation of model sensitivity,
– assessment of observed model properties in scenarios
where selected models interact.
Speciﬁcally, PRAM helps in searching for Nash equilib-
ria in games induced by models interaction, in analysis
of those equilibria properties, and in estimating sensitiv-
ity of results for constraints deﬁning market rules. Con-
sequently, the platform makes it easy to compare market
clearing mechanisms, and to infer about their practical ef-
ﬁcacy. Speciﬁc use scenarios are examining robustness of
those mechanisms when players exhibit unusual behavior
(e.g., speculate) or estimating the maximum disproportion
in players’ market strength when a trading mechanism still
remains eﬃcient.
The main architectural PRAM assumption is ergonomics
for mechanisms testing and ranking. It is also important to
extend existing repository of models easily, by implement-
ing new resource allocation mechanisms and new agents
simulating user behavior.
Fig. 2. The main PRAM modules.
PRAM architecture is a modular one, cf. Fig. 2. The infor-
mation exchanged vertically by the modules are conform-
ing to multicommodity market data model (M3 ), developed
earlier by project participants [9]. The modules of auction
mechanism and auction participants are replaceable, while
the middle layer modules constitute PBMA core. Simu-
lation manager is responsible for starting and setting up
links to agents, performing the simulation, and the cleanup.
Database module provides persistence to experiment con-
ﬁguration data as well as intermediate and ﬁnal results.
User interface module deﬁnes forms for experiments cre-
ation, conﬁguration, running and processing.
3.1. Multicommodity Market Data Model – M3
M3 is a method and format for a formal description of a mar-
ket where trade of resources takes place. It has been ini-
tially developed to describe oﬀer structure in the energy
market in Poland. For its generality, it has been next used
to model IP network bandwidth trade [10]–[13]. Used in
PRAM it eﬀectively describes properties and dependencies
between goods being traded.
M3 deﬁnes the following basic entities and relations be-
tween them:
– network nodes and arcs, describing the topology of
the network where capacity trade takes place,
– market entities (users, providers) that buy or sell re-
sources (capacity),
– resources being oﬀered, with their proper attributes,
– oﬀers, i.e. bindings of market entities and resources,
oﬀered or demanded at a speciﬁc price.
It is also possible to deﬁne compound resources, i.e. con-
taining simple resources and other compound resources.
Analogously, one can deﬁne simple and compound of-
fers and market entities, exploiting the model generality
and ﬂexibility. However, it can also be applied without
knowledge of advanced features, like aggregation facili-
ties. It is possible to declare only key values: offeredPrice,
min/maxValue and shareFactor (1 for sell, –1 for buy of-
fers), leaving other unset. Fields acceptedVolume, along
with sell/buyPrice parameters of commodity structure con-
tain results of the market clearing process.
3.2. Functional Requirements
Functionality of PRAM is determined by three major as-
sumptions:
• The platform will principally be used in research con-
text, and applied for varying set of models interact-
ing.
• Ease of historical results retrieval and comparison is
central.
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• Design patterns, data models and communication
mechanisms applied must make PRAM a valuable
proof of concept of a commercial trading system.
3.3. Platform Users and Resources Being Subject
to Interchange
It is assumed that the main PRAM user is a researcher
or designer of trading mechanisms, i.e. algorithms for re-
source allocation and quoting. PRAM simulation frame-
work provides means to examine interaction of mechanisms
and market entities, both being represented by software
agents. Research via simulation aims to discover phenom-
ena diﬃcult to analyze and predict, like in scenario where
all or part of market participants are human.
Within the project, PRAM is applied to bandwidth al-
location in data networks, but it can easily be used
in other, quite distant, application domains, like paral-
lel problem solving (cf. [14]). The platform is a frame-
work for market simulation; it implements its ﬁxed compo-
nents (the database, simulation manager and user interface)
and exemplary replaceable components (user and auction
mechanisms agents). Two auction mechanisms have been
implemented: balancing communication bandwidth trade
(BCBT – see [12]) and eﬀective bandwidth auction mech-
anism (EBAM – see [13]). They constitute a good starting
point for eventual further development and research.
3.4. The Architecture
PRAM design follows an open system concept, i.e. it facil-
itates rapid new agent prototyping. System architecture is
multigrained, composed of federations of simulation com-
ponents, like user agents that act synchronously, and the
market mechanism, coupled via the simulation manager.
Data persistence is provided by the underlying relational
database module, and PRAM web interface is managed by
the interface module. A single, universal application pro-
gramming interface and communication protocol between
the management module and agents have been designed.
It makes possible to treat all agents uniformly, wherever
possible, as black boxes. On the other hand, simulation
manager operation is, to much extent, transparent for the
agents. Functionalities of the ﬁve types of PRAM modules
are described below.
Auction mechanism agent. It is a functional module
responsible for market clearing, resource allocation and
quoting. It runs, in principle, by performing optimization
tasks, which can be done by external solvers (e.g. CPLEX,
LPSolve) or built-in custom optimization routines. This
module must implement the following operations:
1. Auction initiation. This operation is executed once
at each auction start. It is invoked by the simula-
tion manager, thus informing the auction mechanism
that the auction has just started. The simulation
manager passes information about the system (i.e.
network topology, list of market entities, list of re-
sources being traded, auction-speciﬁc parameters) to
the auction mechanism. Most of the data are stored
in M3 format.
2. Resource allocation. This operation may be executed
more than once, depending on the type of auction.
The simulation manager invokes this operation with
buy/sell oﬀers as arguments. Operation results are
resource allocations and prices set by the auction
mechanism. The operation arguments and results are
expressed in M3 format.
3. Simulation termination. This operation is executed
once for each auction. It is invoked by the simula-
tion manager to communicate the auction mechanism
that it is going to be destroyed because the simula-
tion has just ended. The auction mechanism agent
is given a chance to perform cleanup activities, like
disconnecting from a remote solver.
User agents. It is a functional module implementing mar-
ket entity behavior. Many types of user agents can take
in a single simulation experiment, their emergent collec-
tive behavior being often impossible to be expressed an-
alytically. The main results of user modules operation are
trading buy and/or sell oﬀers that, after being merged by
the simulation manager, get presented to the auction mech-
anism. These modules must implement the following oper-
ations:
1. Auction initiation. Like for the auction mechanism
agent, this operation is executed once at each auction
start. This operation gives also an opportunity to pass
any extra parameters to agents that parametrize their
working, including, e.g. parameters of probability
distribution, IDs of other agents that are going to
form a cartel etc.
2. Offer preparation. On operation invocation actual re-
source allocation and prices are passed to agents. In
response, agents return their new oﬀers to the auction
mechanism. For iterative mechanisms this operation
is executed many times; for one-step mechanisms this
operation is called twice (on the ﬁrst call, there are
no allocations yet; on the second call the auction is
over and no user response is expected).
3. Simulation termination. Like for the auction mecha-
nism, this operation is called only once, on simula-
tion end.
Simulation manager. It is the PRAM central module, re-
sponsible for running experiments, i.e. resource allocation
sessions. Its functionality covers both pure managerial ac-
tivities and in-depth analysis of the data being exchanged.
The simulation manager:
• manages spawning, cleanup and synchronization be-
tween agents;
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• forwards data between user agents and the mecha-
nism;
• merges separate oﬀers into one M3model, presented
to the mechanism;
• calculates predeﬁned simulation outcome statistics.
The fundamental requirement is that multiple heteroge-
neous agents must be managed timely and reliably results
in multithreaded design of the simulation manager. Com-
munication state with each agent is handled in a separate
thread, and the communication technology is Java Mes-
saging Service (JMS). Commands spawning the agents are
delegated from Java to the underlying operating system.
Database module. The database module manages persis-
tence of M3 structures and PRAM-speciﬁc data structures
into a relational database. The data module is the only
interface between other PRAM modules and the database,
providing eﬃcient mapping of Java objects into data ta-
bles, and the database is the only repository of any PRAM
data, which does not preclude database direct access from
other applications. Any M3 data, before being stored into
the database, need to be converted into plain old Java ob-
jects (POJO), using the converters generated automatically
from M3XML schemas (XSD). PRAM database contains
therefore:
• agents conﬁguration (startup parameters, mapping
between software agents and market entities),
• scenario deﬁnitions (selection of M3models, agent
types, general scenario attributes and descriptions),
• M3 intermediate and ﬁnal scenario results (oﬀers,
prices, allocations),
• solution statistics calculated by PRAM.
Graphical user interface. PRAM user web interface
makes it possible for a user to deﬁne and run test sce-
narios, and to ﬁlter, analyze and visualize individual and
aggregated results. Using a diagram, graph or table form,
a user can observe data that are:
• simulation-oriented – all output data (ﬁnal and inter-
mediate allocations, bids and prices) are shown for
a selected scenario;
• resource-oriented – selected resource allocations and
prices are shown for various testing scenarios;
• user-oriented – selected user bids and allocations are
shown for various testing scenarios.
3.5. Data Flows between PRAM Modules
Figure 3 illustrates the data exchanged between PRAM
modules. It must be emphasized that the central role of the
simulation manager is evident as soon as the user requests
to carry out the simulation, while the simulation environ-
Fig. 3. Data ﬂows between PRAM modules.
ment is being initialized. This process, and the simulation
itself, is executed in the following steps:
1. Conﬁguration for simulation is read by the simulation
manager from the database: network topology, mar-
ket entities and, product and oﬀer deﬁnitions, agents
and simulation parameters are loaded.
2. Simulation manager spawns the agents (or waits for
those spawned externally) and waits until they report
they may start simulation.
3. The agents get initialized by the manager.
4. The simulation runs by alternately collecting user
agents oﬀers, merging them and forwarding to the
auction mechanism agent. Mechanism reply, contain-
ing prices and allocations, is passed back to agents,
and the procedure is repeated. Intermediate results
are stored in the database.
5. The simulation is broken on mechanism request, or
when the maximum number of iterations is reached.
Finally, all agents are requested to decommit re-
sources and quit.
PRAM has been implemented in Java language, using se-
lected Java Enterprise Edition components as JMS and Java
Persistence API (JPA – Hibernate implementation). Com-
munication between platform components during simula-
tion is presented in Fig. 4. All experiments data that can
be stored using M3 , are stored in both plain XML text
ﬁles, and as persistent POJO structures. For communica-
tion with agents, only plain XML is used, and any extra
non-M3parameters are passed using Java native serializa-
tion.
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Fig. 4. Communication between modules during simulation.
Graphical user interface acts as a control station for the
whole process of simulation and data analysis. GUI com-
ponent, running on the server side as a web application, is
loosely coupled with other PRAM components via Spring
framework [15]. While operating PRAM, a user can uti-
lize existent external software supporting network topol-
ogy and calendar edition. The software is dedicated to use
M3model, and to operate on M3ﬁles. It operates locally,
and the resulting M3ﬁles can be uploaded to PRAM after-
wards.
4. Comparison Criteria for Bandwidth
Trading Mechanisms
The theory of mechanisms deﬁnes a number of mechanism
properties. Many of those properties are desirable for any
market mechanism being under construction. The proper-
ties can be perceived as criteria for mechanism ranking.
Mechanism engineer, knowing about market peculiarities
(e.g., legal layout, kinds and number of entities, kinds and
structure of resources) may indicate mechanism proper-
ties that are considered important in a given situation. In
a liberal market system the criteria important for individ-
ual entity are usually disjoint from the global criteria, i.e.
important for the society as a whole. Apart from mech-
anism evaluation according to the two above viewpoints,
one may consider the third approach: mechanism technical
eﬃciency.
4.1. Global criteria
Economic eﬃciency. Social welfare is considered the prin-
cipal measure of a mechanism eﬃciency. Social welfare is
the total of real economic beneﬁts from the trade of com-
modities. If the user best strategy in a market mechanism
is to bid according to his valuation, then the social welfare
can be calculated using the prices oﬀered by market par-
ticipants. Otherwise, social welfare can be approximated
by so called economic beneﬁt, i.e. the diﬀerence of the
total value of goods being bought and the total value of
goods being sold, using transaction prices instead of the
valuations.
Incentive compatibility. A mechanism is incentive com-
patible if a user best strategy is to announce all his private
valuation information, i.e. if a user has no incentive to
bid untruthfully. A mechanism is incentive compatible if
users’ truthful strategies are their best strategies, and there-
fore are the market game equilibria. Incentive compatibility
prevents any individual or collective actions diverging from
the optimal strategy. A good measure of such prevention
is a so-called allocation ineﬃciency.
Budgetary balance. A market is in budgetary balance if
the money ﬂow from goods acquisition is equal to the ﬂow
from goods sales. This means that a market driven by
a mechanism enforcing budgetary balance does not require
any subsidy, neither it generates any surplus.
Market concentration. Entities that have considerable
market share may inﬂuence the clearing process and
jeopardize assumed mechanism properties. Herﬁndahl-
Hirschman index (HHI) is used to measure market con-
centration; it is calculated by summing squared percentage
market shares for all market entities.
Pareto eﬃciency. The game outcome is Pareto-eﬃcient
when it is possible to increase proﬁts of one market entity
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only at the cost of the proﬁt loss by some other entity or
entities. In other words, the outcome of the game is not
dominated in Pareto sense by any other outcome. It is par-
ticularly instructive to apply the term of Pareto eﬃciency to
resource allocation problem. The resource allocation prob-
lem solution in market economy is a detailed register or
description of what resource has been assigned to whom.
Solution space is deﬁned by the current state of technol-
ogy and the amount of available resources in the economy.
The ﬁnal allocation solution depends always on customers’
preferences. Therefore, for given preferences, technology
and resources if an allocation is Pareto-eﬃcient, it is im-
possible to ﬁnd another allocation improving somebody’s
proﬁts without spoiling someone else’s proﬁts.
4.2. Individual Criteria
Individual proﬁt maximization. Every single market par-
ticipant is interested that the market mechanism makes it
possible to maximize participant’s proﬁt. On incentive
compatible markets individual proﬁt maximization do really
takes place. However, society expectations are often that
market prices should stay as low as possible, for the bene-
ﬁt of customers. Under such demand one can still design
a mechanism for individual manufacturer proﬁt maximiza-
tion. It requires the original problem to be reformulated so
that society expectations are considered superior to proﬁt
maximization – they can be, for example, treated as con-
straints to mechanism outcome.
Absolute fairness – individual rationality. A mechanism
is considered to be absolutely fair when none of the players
will incur individual loss, i.e. the player proﬁt will be
positive. In fact, this simple criterion preconditions the
player participation in the market.
Individual relative fairness. A mechanism is considered
to be relatively fair from one’s point of view if the other
competitive oﬀers are not favored at his/her costs. This
broad term encompasses more speciﬁc criteria:
• Anonymity. Market players are treated anonymously
if the order of their numbering does not inﬂuence the
outcome.
• Symmetry. Any two players characterised by equal
parameter values, i.e. players having the same pref-
erences (in the sense of their utility functions) and
capabilities (in the sense of quality, amount and ge-
ographical availability of services oﬀered) should be
given equal allocations outcome.
• Price uniformity. A mechanism is fair if the price of
a service is equal for all customers.
4.3. Mechanism Technical Efficiency
The most important criterion of mechanism technical ef-
ﬁciency is the possibility of the mechanism to be de-
ployed and successfully used. Successful implementation
of a mechanism depends on complexity of the under-
lying algorithms and on algorithms robustness. Typical
measures characterizing mechanism technical eﬃciency
are:
– market clearing time,
– total market clearing time (for iterative mechanisms),
– number of exchanged messages (average per user),
– number of lost messages (i.e. messages that did not
count in the process of market clearing).
5. Conclusion
The platform for research on auction mechanisms in its cur-
rent state of development should be perceived as a group-
work environment used for design and simulation veriﬁ-
cation of resource allocation mechanisms. Genericity of
PRAM algorithms for experiments data selection and eval-
uation have implied use of somewhat prolix M3 data format
and clumsiness of graphical user interface. The next step
in PRAM development is to implement user agents being
operated by a human. This will make possible to run sim-
ulation scenarios where some market users will be played
by e.g. students, being confronted with each other as well
as with automated software agents.
In the long run, PRAM commercialization can be consid-
ered. Although the platform has already adopted a number
of concepts and technologies used in enterprise applications
(tiered architecture, JMS, Hibernate [16], GWT [17]), mak-
ing it a fully-ﬂedged business application requires adding
many new functionalities. They include: authentication and
authorization, scalability, repository protection, SLA guar-
antees etc. The architectural solutions implemented so far
in PRAM have been selected deliberately to facilitate such
transition.
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